Tag: unfunded liability

No Hope In Sight For Chicago’s Worst-In-The-Nation Pension Plans

Mary Pat Campbell

Link:https://www.forbes.com/sites/ebauer/2023/08/01/no-hope-in-sight-for-chicagos-worst-in-the-nation-pension-plans/?sh=4fd6218f24c2

Excerpt:

Back on July 18, the Equable Institute released the 2023 version of its annual State of Pensions report, which means that, yes, it’s time for another check-in on these infamously-poorly-funded pension plans. Among the wealth of tables is a list of the best and worst-funded of the 58 local pension plans studied, and, yes, you guessed it, the bottom five spots are Chicago plans, with the bottom three at levels far below all others:

  • Municipal employees, 21% funded,
  • Chicago police, 21.8% funded, and
  • Chicago fire, 18.8% funded.

Combined with the Chicago Laborers’ pension fund, with a 41% funded status, the pensions for which the city bears a direct responsibility have a total pension debt on a market value of assets basis of $35 billion. (This data is from the actual reports*, released in May, which doesn’t match the Equable report precisely.) Spot fifth-worst is taken up by the Chicago Teachers, at 42.4% funded, and the first non-Chicago system in their list, Dallas Police & Fire at 45.2%, is twice as well funded, percentage-point-wise, as the Terrible Trio.

…..

What’s more, Ralph Martire and his Center for Tax and Budget Accountability continue to promote what he calls “reamortization” as a solution to the problem, both through an April Chicago Sun Times commentary and through the release of a report, “Understanding – and Resolving Illinois’ Pension Funding Challenges” (which is an update of a prior proposal). This proposal, which is directed at Illinois pensions but is clearly meant based on other comments to be an all-purpose fix, sounds innocuous, as merely a sort of “refinancing” as one might with a mortgage, but it’s really much more as he proposes to

  • Reduce the funded status target from 90% to 80%, based on the claim that the GAO deems this funded status to be the right target for a “healthy” plan (whether he deliberately misleads or not, he is wrong here, the National Association of State Retirement Administrators or NASRA clearly explained more than a decade ago that 100% funding is always the right target and the only significance of an 80% level is that private sector pension law requires plans funded less than 80% to take immediate corrective action rather than have a long-term funding schedule, and the American Academy of Actuaries more explicitly calls this a “myth”);
  • Issue large sums of Pension Obligation Bonds, which were questionable already when they first began promoting this but are now a terrible idea with our current high bond rates, all the more so for a low-credit-rating city such as Chicago; and
  • Move contributions from last day of the fiscal year to the first day, which he argues would be a gain of a year’s investment return while forgetting that it requires the city to have this money on Day 1 and forgo the other uses it would have.

Author(s): Elizabeth Bauer

Publication Date: 1 Aug 2023

Publication Site: Forbes

Chicago Confronts $35B Pension Crisis, Among Nation’s Worst

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.governing.com/finance/chicago-confronts-35b-pension-crisis-among-nations-worst?utm_campaign=Newsletter%20-%20GOV%20-%20Daily&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=266392609&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-908JiZoECoiHOSFWeUAutUv8VbdD2wEgfZjFzCrsEv6iI9JACAt9QL1zdrKBCqmO35ZPGv3sCgZURy904H11nrX4AQ5RWJg5Ti63o3xBq99exXZg0&utm_content=266392609&utm_source=hs_email

Excerpt:

One of Brandon Johnson’s first moves as Chicago mayor was to buy himself time to address the city’s biggest financial problem: the more than $35 billion owed to its pension funds.

Just days after his May inauguration, Johnson persuaded state lawmakers to shelve legislation that would’ve added billions to the pension debt, while pledging to establish a working group to come up with solutions by October.

Now, the clock is ticking for the progressive Democrat to fix the worst pension crisis among major U.S. cities.

Just as Chicago reels from a spate of shootings and carjackings, inequities exacerbated by the pandemic and high-profile corporate departures, its pension gap creates a financial burden that threatens its recovery and the mayor’s agenda.

The situation makes for a cautionary tale for municipalities across the country facing long-neglected contributions and funding shortfalls. Already, the third-largest U.S. city spends roughly $1 of every $5 on pensions, while more than 80 percent of property-tax dollars go toward retirement payouts.

….

In 2022, for the first time, the city put in an actuarially calculated contribution for all four pensions funds – a step that helped it shed the junk rating.

Author(s): Shruti Date Singh, Bloomberg News, TNS

Publication Date: 14 July 2023

Publication Site: Governing

Canadian legislation aimed at protecting pension plans may mean significant changes for lenders, borrowers and employees

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge/publications/e91814ee/canadian-legislation-aimed-at-protecting-pension-plans-may-mean-significant-changes

Excerpt:

On February 3, 2022, Bill C-228 was introduced as a private members bill and has now made its way to the third reading in Canada’s Senate. The purpose of Bill C-228 is to greatly expand the pension liabilities that are afforded super priority status by amending bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. As currently drafted, the Bill will grant priority for a pension plan’s unfunded liability or solvency deficiency claims over the claims of the majority of creditors — including secured creditors — unless specifically enumerated otherwise in the statutes.

The “unfunded liability” is the amount necessary to enable the fund to continuously pay member benefits as they come due, on the assumption that the fund will operate for an indefinite period of time. The “solvency deficiency” includes the amount necessary to ensure the fund meets its obligations if wound up. As these amounts are constantly fluctuating, a fixed value cannot be ascribed to either of these requirements other than through a single point in time calculation by an actuary.

What does this mean for borrowers with pension plans?

Clearly, Bill C-228 would substantially increase the opportunity for recovery of pension entitlements within insolvency proceedings by way of super priority. The issue is whether it remains viable for lenders to provide capital to borrowers with defined benefit pension plans given the increased risk profile that may be created by Bill C-228 expanding the pension claims that take priority over a secured creditor in an insolvency case.

In all likelihood, Bill C-228 will minimally effect borrowers that have defined-contribution pension plans as the employer’s liability is restricted to predefined contributions. As this type of plan is subject only to ordinary course known contribution requirements, and given that the employer does not guarantee a certain amount of income in retirement, the liability afforded super priority in insolvency proceedings should be predictable in most circumstances.

Conversely, Bill C-228 will significantly impact defined-benefit pension plans. These types of plans commit to providing a specified level of income in retirement based on a variety of factors. As such, an employer must diligently manage the pension fund to ensure it is in a position to pay the benefit to the employee for the remainder of their life, once retired. The inherent challenge with these plans is the uncertainty of the liability of the employer at any given time and the potentially large scope of that liability based in part on external factors such as interest rate fluctuations.

Bill C-228 has therefore created a conundrum. Although the intention of the Bill is to protect pension plans, it may potentially cause a shift that results in even more employers moving from a defined-benefit pension plan to a defined-contribution pension plan. Plainly, this shift may be caused by lenders’ concerns regarding the uncertainty surrounding the amount necessary to liquidate an unfunded liability or solvency deficiency at any given time. In other words, a lender will not be able to determine prior to the lending decision, with any great certainty, the amount of the unfunded liability or solvency deficiency in a future insolvency proceeding. At a minimum, a secured creditor wants to know the quantum of obligations that will take priority over their interests. This is essential information in deciding the quantum of a loan, the terms of such loan, any reserves and whether the creditor will agree to loan any money to the borrower.

Author(s): Candace Formosa

Publication Date: 2023Q2

Publication Site: Norton Rose Fulbright

The Sustainability of State & Local Pensions: A Public Finance Approach

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://crr.bc.edu/briefs-state-local-pensions/the-sustainability-of-state-local-pensions-a-public-finance-approach/

Graphics:

Key findings:

  • Many experts favor full prefunding of state and local pensions to maintain fiscal sustainability, which means big contribution hikes.
  • This analysis explores an alternative: stabilizing pension debt as a share of GDP.
  • Under current contribution rates, baseline projections show no sign of a major crisis in the next two decades even if asset returns are low.
  • Yet, many plans will be at risk over the long term of exhausting their assets, so action will be needed.
  • Plans can reach a sustainable footing by stabilizing their debt-to-GDP ratio, with much smaller contribution hikes than under full funding.

Author(s): Louise Sheiner

Publication Date: 11 April 2023

Publication Site: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College

How a Bankrupt City’s Pension System Hit a Breaking Point

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.route-fifty.com/finance/2023/01/chester-pennsylvania-municipal-chapter-9-bankruptcy/382142/

Graphic:

Excerpt:

A key driver of the conflict is around fiscal management and disclosure. Amid its budget troubles, the city has racked up $750,000 in Internal Revenue Service penalties related to unpaid payroll taxes, fell victim to a $400,000 phishing scam that wasn’t publicly disclosed for months, cycled through two chief financial officers in as many years and has failed to produce an audited financial report since 2018. But perhaps the most striking example of the problems surrounding the city’s bankruptcy is the discord—and conflicting information—around Chester’s underfunded police pension. 

Like other distressed cities, Chester has an outsized pension liability and annual pension bills that would take up a substantial portion of its budget if paid in full. But also like other cities, Chester hadn’t been paying its entire bill—called the Minimum Municipal Obligation (MMO) in Pennsylvania. In 2021, the city paid its full MMO for the first time since 2013 and it was a significant lift. The total it spent on pension and retiree health care costs that year—$14.6 million—took up 28% of its entire general fund.

But there’s a bigger problem: Due to accounting practices that inflated the plan’s assets and a dispute over what the city’s police pension formula actually is, no one really knows what Chester’s true unfunded liabilities are.

Author(s): Liz Farmer

Publication Date: 24 Jan 2023

Publication Site: Route Fifty

Nevada’s Pension Debt Soars to $18B, Teachers Pay Nation’s Highest Retirement Costs

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.npri.org/pension-debt-soars-nv-teachers-now-pay-highest-rates-in-us/

Graphic:

Excerpt:

PERS consists of two separate plans: one for police and fire members (the safety plan); and one for everyone else (the regular plan).

The annual contribution rates for safety plan members will rise to 50 percent in July — which means taxpayers must send PERS an additional 50 cents for every $1 in salary paid to police officers and firefighters. The contribution rate for regular plan members, which includes teachers, will rise to 33.5 percent of salary.

PERS costs are split evenly between taxpayers and the employee, with the employee typically paying their half through an equivalent salary reduction. This means that regular plan members, which include teachers, will see their paychecks reduced by nearly 17 percent annually starting this July — a rate that is higher than what any other group of comparable public employees nationwide pays for their respective PERS plan.

Unfortunately, these record-high contributions will not be enough to stop PERS’s debt from continuing to grow, according to the system’s just-released actuarial report.

Indeed, PERS’s actuary had determined that much larger rate increases are needed (37.5 percent for regular plan members and 57.5 percent for safety members), but the PERS Board directed the actuary to “phase-in” the necessary cost increase incrementally over four years, rather than all at once. But there is a cost to delaying the implementation of the necessary contribution rate increases — more debt, and thus a greater likelihood of future rate hikes.

Author(s): Robert Fellner

Publication Date: 9 Jan 2023

Publication Site: Nevada Policy Research Institute

BIDEN PROMISES NEARLY $36 BILLION FOR NATIONAL PENSION BAILOUTS

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.illinoispolicy.org/biden-promises-nearly-36-billion-for-national-pension-bailouts/

Excerpt:

The Biden administration promised nearly $36 billion to stabilize pension plans for Teamsters nationwide after forecasts predicted the system’s default by 2026. Union members would have seen their retirement benefits slashed by 60% if the system defaulted.

President Joe Biden announced Dec. 8 the federal government will use nearly $36 billion to stabilize failing Teamsters union pension plans nationwide, preventing severe benefits cuts for more than 350,000 union workers.

….

Illinois is home to more than 20 Teamster’s chapters and the nation’s worst pension debt, estimated at nearly $140 billion by state authorities in 2022. Private investor services projected that debt as high as $313 billion, using more realistic assumptions on returns.

In September these state pension funds had just 47 cents for every dollar in promised pension benefits.

Springfield lawmakers cannot routinely rely on federal authorities to bail out overly generous and underfunded state and local pensions. Illinois public servants deserve to receive the retirements they’ve been promised in full – not the 40% that would remain after default.

Author(s): Patrick Andriesen

Publication Date: 12 Dec 2022

Publication Site: Illinois Policy Institute

ILLINOIS PUBLIC PENSION DEBT GROWS TO $140B

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-public-pension-debt-grows-to-140b/

Graphic:

Excerpt:

Illinois’ five statewide pensions system saw their debt increase by nearly $10 billion to a grand total of $140 billion in fiscal year 2022. Pensions will cost the state nearly $11 billion next year, but that’s still $4.4 billion too little.

Illinois’ state pension debt now stands at $139.7 billion, according to a new report from the Illinois General Assembly’s Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability.

That is up $9.8 billion from 2021, when state pensions were benefitting from healthy investment returns. After markets cooled substantially, state pension debt in the fiscal year that ended July 1 continued to grow, increasing for the 11th time in 15 years.

Author(s): Bryce Hill

Publication Date: 14 Dec 2022

Publication Site: Illinois Policy Institute

Reality check: New actuarial report says Illinois’ biggest pension, TRS, sunk $6 billion further into the hole in FY 2022 – Wirepoints Quickpoint

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://wirepoints.org/reality-check-new-actuarial-report-says-illinois-biggest-pension-trs-sunk-6-billion-further-into-the-hole-in-fy-2022-wirepoints-quickpoint/

Excerpt:

The first actuarial report is out for an Illinois pension for fiscal year 2022, which ended on June 30. It’s for the TRS, the Teachers Retirement System, which accounts for well over half of Illinois state-level pension debt.

Unfunded liabilities grew about $6 billion from $74.7 billion to $80.7 billion on a fair asset value basis. Its funded ratio worsened from 46.2% to 43.8%. The drop occurred despite a one-time, special contribution by taxpayers to the fund of $173 million that was in addition to their annual, scheduled contributions.

Expect Illinois’ other pensions to suffer similarly dismal results as their 2022 reports are published.

Author(s): Mark Glennon

Publication Date: 7 Dec 2022

Publication Site: Wirepoints

Candidates discuss Illinois’ unfunded pension debt

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.thecentersquare.com/illinois/gubernatorial-candidates-discuss-plans-to-shore-up-illinois-unfunded-pension-debt/article_d4ee1dcc-5acc-11ed-ba1f-5f5508ee672f.html

Excerpt:

Candidates for Illinois governor are taking different approaches on how they’d tackle the state’s unfunded pension liabilities.

Illinois has among the most unfunded public sector employee pension liability. State numbers indicate around $151 billion unfunded, but some place like the American Legislative Exchange Council place the debt at $533 billion.

State Sen. Darren Bailey, who’s running against incumbent Democratic Gov. J.B. Pritzker, said he’ll use reduced state spending to pay down pensions.

“We’ll find the fat in the budget and we’ll begin to apply that to get this pension situation under control, but first and foremost, I will be sitting at the table with pensioners,” Bailey, R-Xenia, told The Center Square. “I fear that the pension debt may be that large looming problem that will sneak up on Illinois if we continue to ignore it as J.B. Pritzker has.”

Pritzker touts on his campaign website “fully funding pension contributions” as a way to reduce state pension liabilities, “going above and beyond with payments and expanding the employee pension buyout program.”

Pritzker’s campaign did not return requests for an interview.

Author(s): Greg Bishop

Publication Date: 2 Nov 2022

Publication Site: The Center Square

5500 – Central States – 2021

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://burypensions.wordpress.com/2022/10/20/5500-central-states-2021/

Graphic:

Excerpt:

With the 5500 filing season done it is time to tentatively get back to some blogging – starting with the plan that was likely to bring the PBGC (and the entire private pension system) down before the SFA bailout and now will be another cog in the hyperinflation wheelbarrow.

We had some 5500 history in an earlier blog through 2016. This is where the plan was last year based on their 5500 filing for 2021:

Plan Name: Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Plan

EIN/PN: 36-6044243/001

Total participants @ 12/31/21: 357,056 including:

  • Retirees: 189,449
  • Separated but entitled to benefits: 117,511
  • Still working: 50,096

Asset Value (Market) @ 1/1/21: 10,409,440,502

Value of liabilities using RPA rate (2.43%) @ 1/1/21: $58,623,837,073 including:

  • Retirees: $34,084,275,398
  • Separated but entitled to benefits: $15,801,905,005
  • Still working: $8,736,875,945

Funded ratio: 17.76%

Author(s): John Bury

Publication Date: 20 Oct 2022

Publication Site: burypensions

Examining the Experiences of Public Pension Plans Since the Great Recession

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.nirsonline.org/reports/greatrecession/

PDF of report: https://www.nirsonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/compressedExamining-the-Experiences-of-Public-Pension-Plans-Since-the-Great-Recession-10.13.pdf

Webinar slides: https://www.nirsonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/FINAL-Great-Recession-Retro-Public-Webinar.pdf

Video:

Graphic:

Excerpt:

This report finds that state and local government retirement systems on the whole successfully navigated the 2007 to 2009 Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, public retirement systems across the nation have adapted in the years since the recession by taking actions to ensure continued long-term resiliency.

Examining the Experiences of Public Pension Plans Since the Great Recession is authored by Tyler Bond, NIRS Research Manager, Dan Doonan, NIRS Executive Director, Todd Tauzer, Segal Vice President and Actuary, and Ronald Temple, Lazard Managing Director and Co-Head of Multi-Asset and Head of U.S. Equity.

The report finds:

  • The majority of public pension plans recovered their pre- recession asset levels within six years, while continuing to pay over a trillion dollars in benefits. In recent years, public plans have reported record-high asset levels.
  • Discount rates, or the assumed rate of return on investments, have broadly decreased from eight to seven percent for the median public pension plan, based on actuarial and financial forecasts of future market returns.
  • Generational mortality tables, possible today with more advanced financial modeling software, have been broadly adopted by nearly all large public plans and future longevity improvements are now incorporated into standard financial projections.
  • Many public plans have shortened amortization periods, or the period of time required to pay off an unfunded actuarial accrued liability, to align with evolving actuarial best practices. Tightening amortization periods, akin to paying off a mortgage more quickly, has had the effect of increasing short- term costs. In the long run, plans and stakeholders will benefit.
  • The intense focus on public plan investment programs since the Great Recession misses the more important structural changes that generally have had a larger impact on plan finances and the resources necessary for retirement security.
  • Plans have adjusted strategic asset allocations in response to market conditions. With less exposure to public equities and fixed income, plans increased exposure to real estate, private equity, and hedge funds.
  • Professionally managed public defined benefit plans rebalance investments during volatile times and avoid the behavioral drag observed in retail investment.

Author(s): Dan Doonan, Ron Temple, Todd Tauzer, Tyler Bond

Publication Date: October 2022

Publication Site: NIRS