TD Was Convenient for Criminals

Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-10-14/td-was-convenient-for-criminals?srnd=undefined

Excerpt:

But TD Bank’s problem — which led to the largest AML-failures penalty ever — was not just about ignoring red flags. The more fundamental problem is that TD Bank tried to do its anti-money-laundering compliance on the cheap, and the prosecutors and regulators hate that. The Justice Department says:

[The TD Bank Global Anti-Money Laundering (GAML) group]’s budget was a primary driver of its decisions about projects, hiring, staffing, and technology enhancements throughout the relevant period. GAML executives strove to maintain what TD Bank Group referred to as a “flat cost paradigm” or “zero expense growth paradigm,” meaning that each department’s budget, including GAML’s, was expected to remain flat year-over-year, despite consistent growth in TD Bank Group’s revenue over the relevant period. This budgetary pressure originated with senior bank executives and was achieved within GAML and US-AML by [its chief AML officer] and [its Bank Secrecy Act officer], both of whom touted their abilities to operate within the “flat cost paradigm without compromising risk appetite” in their self-assessments. GAML’s base and project expenditures on USAML were less in fiscal year 2021 than they were in fiscal year 2018 and were not sufficient to address AML deficiencies including substantial backlogs of alerts across multiple workstreams, despite TDBNA’s profits increasing approximately 26% during the same period. In 2019, [the chief AML officer] referred to the Bank’s “historical underspend” on compliance in an email to the Group senior executive responsible for the enterprise AML budget, yet the US-AML budget essentially stayed flat. GAML and US-AML employees explained to the Offices that budgetary restrictions led to systemic deficiencies in the Bank’s transaction monitoring program and exposed the Bank to potential legal and regulatory consequences.

That, I think, is why the fine was so big. The message that this case is meant to send to banks is “if your compliance team wants more money to build a better AML program, you’d better give it to them, because otherwise we will fine you orders of magnitude more money than you would have spent.” The attorney general said:

TD Bank chose profits over compliance, in order to keep its costs down.

That decision is now costing the bank billions of dollars in criminal and civil penalties.

The deputy attorney general added:

We are putting down a clear marker on what we expect from financial institutions — and the consequences for failure.

When it comes to compliance, there are really only two options: invest now – or face severe consequences later.

As I’ve said before, a corporate strategy that pursues profits at the expense of compliance isn’t a path to riches; it’s a path to federal prosecution.

One job of a bank is to stop crime, which means that banks employ thousands of people who essentially work for the US Department of Justice. But the Department of Justice has no direct control over how many of those people there are, how much they get paid or what resources they have. Law enforcement agencies cannot directly set the banks’ budgets for anti-money-laundering programs, even though those budgets really are part of law enforcement. It is, perhaps, a frustrating situation: The Justice Department would like banks to spend more money catching criminals, and it can’t quite make them.

Except obviously it can. The Justice Department can’t directly set banks’ AML budgets, but it can do it indirectly, and it just did. If you are a bank compliance officer and you want to hire 2,000 people and get some shiny new computers, you can go to your regulators and say “do we need to spend this money on AML,” and they will say “that would be better,” and you will go to your chief executive officer with a transcript of the TD Bank press conference, and you will get whatever you want. 

Author(s): Matt Levine

Publication Date: 14 Oct 2024

Publication Site: Bloomberg

Climate risk vs. interest-rate risk

Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-18/coinbase-trades-beanie-babies

Excerpt:

An important meta-story that you could tell about financial markets over the past few years would be that, for a long time, interest rates were roughly zero, which means that discount rates were low: A dollar in the distant future was worth about as much as a dollar today. Therefore, investors ascribed a lot of value to very long-term stuff, and were not particularly concerned about short-term profitability. Low discount rates made speculative distant-future profits worth more and steady current profits worth less.

And then interest rates went up rapidly starting in 2022, and everyone’s priorities shifted. A dollar today is now worth a lot more than a dollar in 10 years. People prioritize profits today over speculation in the future.

This is a popular story to tell about the boom in, for instance, tech startups, or crypto: “Startups are a low-interest-rate phenomenon.” In 2020, people had a lot of money and a lot of patience, so they were willing to invest in speculative possibly-world-changing ideas that would take a long time to pay out. (Or to fund startups that lost money on every transaction in the long-term pursuit of market share.) In 2022, the Fed raised rates, people’s preferences changed, and the startup and crypto bubbles popped. 

I suppose, though, that you could tell a similar story about environmental investing? Climate change is, plausibly, a very large and very long-term threat to a lot of businesses. If you just go around doing everything normally this year, probably rising oceans won’t wash away your factories this year. But maybe they will in 2040. Maybe you should invest today in making your factories ocean-proof, or in cutting carbon emissions so the oceans don’t rise: That will cost you some money today, but will save you some money in 2040. Is it worth it? Well, depends on the discount rate. If rates are low, you will care more about 2040. If rates are high, you will care more about saving money today.

We have talked a few times about the argument that some kinds of environmental investing — the kind where you avoid investing in “dirty” companies, to starve them of capital and reduce the amount of dirty stuff they do — can be counterproductive, because it has the effect of raising those companies’ discount rates and thus making them even more short-term-focused. And being short-term-focused probably leads to more carbon emissions. (If you make it harder for coal companies to raise capital, maybe nobody will start a coal company, but existing coal companies will dig up more coal faster.)

But that argument applies more broadly. If you raise every company’s discount rate (because interest rates go up), then every company should be more short-term-focused. Every company should care a bit less about global temperatures in 2040, and a bit more about maximizing profits now. Maybe ESG was itself a low-interest-rates phenomenon.

Anyway here’s a Financial Times story about BlackRock Inc.:

BlackRock will stress “financial resilience” in its talks with companies this year as the $10tn asset manager puts less emphasis on climate concerns amid a political backlash to environmental, social and governance investing.

With artificial intelligence and high interest rates rattling companies globally, BlackRock wants to know how they are managing these risks to ensure they deliver long-term financial returns, the asset manager said on Thursday as it detailed its engagement priorities for 2024.

BlackRock reviews these priorities annually as it talks with thousands of companies before their annual meetings on issues ranging from how much their executives are paid to how effective their board directors are.

“The macroeconomic and geopolitical backdrop companies are operating in has changed. This new economic regime is shaped by powerful structural forces that we believe may drive divergent performance across economies, sectors and companies,” BlackRock said in its annual report on its engagement priorities. “We are particularly interested in learning from investee companies about how they are adapting to strengthen their financial resilience.”

There is a lot going on here, and it is reasonable to wonder— as the FT does — whether BlackRock’s shift from environmental concerns to high interest rates is about the political and marketing backlash to ESG. But you could take it on its own terms! In 2020, interest rates were zero, and BlackRock’s focus was on the long term. What was the biggest long-term risk to its portfolio? Arguably, climate change. So it went around talking to companies about climate change. In 2024, interest rates are high, and the short term matters more, so BlackRock is going around talking to companies about interest-rate risk.

I don’t know how AI fits into this model. For most of my life, “ooh artificial intelligence will change everything” has been a pretty long-term — like, science-fiction long-term — thing to think about. But I suppose now “how will you integrate large-language-model chatbots into your workflows” is an immediate question.

Author(s): Matt Levine

Publication Date: 18 Jan 2024

Publication Site: Bloomberg

ESG Crime

Link:https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-17/making-esg-a-crime

Excerpt:

Oh sure whatever:

Republican lawmakers in New Hampshire are seeking to make using ESG criteria in state funds a crime in the latest attack on the beleaguered investing strategy.

Representatives led by Mike Belcher introduced a bill that would prohibit the state’s treasury, pension fund and executive branch from using investments that consider environmental, social and governance factors. “Knowingly” violating the law would be a felony punishable by not less than one year and no more than 20 years imprisonment, according to the proposal.

Pensions & Investments reports:

“Executive branch agencies that are permitted to invest funds shall review their investments and pursue any necessary steps to ensure that no funds or state-controlled investments are invested with firms that invest New Hampshire funds in accounts with any regard whatsoever based on environmental, social, and governance criteria,” the bill said.

The New Hampshire Retirement System “shall adhere to their fiduciary obligation and not invest with any firm that will invest state retirement system funds in investment funds that consider environmental, social, and governance criteria, as the investment goal should be to obtain the highest return on investment for New Hampshire’s taxpayers and retirees,” the bill said.

Investors aren’t allowed to consider governance! Imagine if this was the law; imagine if it was a felony for an investment manager to consider governance “with any regard whatsoever.”

….

I’m sorry, this is so stupid. “ESG” is essentially about considering certain risks to a company’s financial results: You might want to avoid investing in a company if its factories are going to be washed away by rising oceans, or if its main product is going to be regulated out of existence, or if its position on controversial social issues will cost it sales, or if its CEO controls the board and spends too much corporate money on wasteful personal projects. Obviously ESG in practice is also other, more controversial things:

  1. If you care about the environment, social issues, etc., you might want to invest in companies that you think are environmentally or socially good, whether or not they are good financial investments.
  2. You might incorrectly convince yourself that the stuff you think is environmentally or socially good is also good for the bottom line: You might have a wishful estimate of how quickly the world will transition away from fossil fuels, to justify your desire not to invest in oil companies. You might tell yourself “this company’s stance on social issues will cost it lots of customers” when really the customers don’t care, but you do.

But if you make it a crime for investors to consider certain financial risks then you get too much of those risks.

In particular, I suspect, you get too much governance risk. If every investor tomorrow said “okay we don’t care about the environment,” most companies probably wouldn’t ramp up their pollution: Their executives probably don’t want to pollute unnecessarily, polluting probably wouldn’t help the bottom line, and many companies just sit at computers developing software and couldn’t pollute much if they wanted to. But if every investor tomorrow said “okay we don’t care about governance,” then, I mean, “governance” is just a way of saying “somebody makes sure that the CEO is doing a good job and doesn’t pay herself too much.” If the investors don’t care about that, then a lot of CEOs will be happy to give themselves raises and spend more time on the corporate jet to their vacation homes.

Author(s): Matt Levine

Publication Date: 17 Jan 2024

Publication Site: Bloomberg

SBF Was Reckless From the Start

Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-10-04/sbf-was-reckless-from-the-start?srnd=undefined#xj4y7vzkg

Excerpt:

First: “A Jane Street intern had what amounted to a professional obligation to take any bet with a positive expected value”? Really? I feel like, if you are a trading intern, you are really there to learn two things. One is, sure, take bets with positive expected value and avoid bets with negative expected value.

But the other is about bet sizing. As a Jane Street intern, you have $100 to bet each day, and your quasi-job is to turn that into as much money as possible. Is betting all of it (or even $98) on a single bet with a 1% edge really optimal?[6] 

People have thought about this question! Like, this is very much a central thing that traders and trading firms worry about. The standard starting point is the Kelly criterion, which computes a maximum bet size based on your edge and the size of your bankroll. Given the intern’s bankroll of $100, I think Kelly would tell you to put at most $10 on this bet, depending on what exactly you mean by “this bet.”[7] Betting $98 is too much.

I am being imprecise, and for various reasons you might not expect the interns to stick to Kelly in this situation. But when I read about interns lining up to lose their entire bankroll on bets with 1% edge, I think, “huh, that’s aggressive, what are they teaching those interns?” (I suppose the $100 daily loss limit is the real lesson about position sizing: The interns who wipe out today get to come back and play again tomorrow.) 

But I also think about a Twitter argument that Bankman-Fried had with Matt Hollerbach in 2020, in which Bankman-Fried scoffed at the Kelly criterion and said that “I, personally, would do more” than the Kelly amount. “Why? Because ultimately my utility function isn’t really logarithmic. It’s closer to linear.” As he tells Lewis, “he had use for ‘infinity dollars’” — he was going to become a trillionaire and use the money to cure disease and align AI and defeat Trump, sure — so he always wanted to maximize returns.

But as Hollerbach pointed out, this misunderstands why trading firms use the Kelly criterion.[8] Jane Street does not go around taking any bet with a positive expected value. The point of Kelly is not about utility curves; it’s not “having $200 is less than twice as pleasant as having $100, so you should be less willing to take big risks for big rewards.” The point of Kelly is about maximizing your chances of surviving and obtaining long-run returns: It’s “if you bet 50% of your bankroll on 1%-edge bets, you’ll be more likely to win each bet than lose it, but if you keep doing that you will probably lose all your money eventually.” Kelly is about sizing your bets so you can keep playing the game and make the most money possible in the long run. Betting more can make you more money in the short run, but if you keep doing it you will end in ruin.

Author(s): Matt Levine

Publication Date: 4 Oct 2023

Publication Site: Bloomberg

It’s Easy To Make Oil Companies ESG

Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-07-12/it-s-easy-to-make-oil-companies-esg#xj4y7vzkg

Excerpt:

You can do this with anything! Absolutely anything:

  • Horrible Coal Inc. wants to raise money.
  • It sets up a special purpose vehicle, Hypertechnical Investments Ltd.
  • Horrible Coal issues bonds to Hypertechnical Investments.
  • Hypertechnical issues its own bonds to ESG funds: “We are just a little old investment firm, just two traders and two computers, no carbon emissions here! And our credit is very good, because we have no other liabilities and our assets are all investment-grade bonds. ‘Which investment-grade bonds,’ did you ask? Sorry, I’m not sure I heard you right, you’re breaking up. Anyway we’ll look for your check, bye!”

Though my made-up names are silly, and in the actual Aramco case one of the not-an-oil-company SPVs is named “GreenSaif Pipelines Bidco.” “Pipelines” is right in the name! The only way you would think that GreenSaif Pipelines Bidco “had no direct links to the fossil-fuel industry” is if (1) you started reading the name but stopped after you got to the “Green” part (plausible!) or (2) you never read the name at all, never thought about it, just looked at the balance sheet and saw only shares of stock, not pipelines or oil wells, and said “ah, stock, well, that’s green enough.”

Author(s): Matt Levine

Publication Date: 12 July 2023

Publication Site: Money Stuff at Bloomberg

People Will Pay for Illiquidity

Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-11-01/people-will-pay-for-illiquidity

Excerpt:

Adding liquidity is, conventionally, desirable. It reduces risk: If you can sell a thing easily, that makes it less risky to buy it, so you are more likely to commit capital to the thing. It increases demand: If only a few rich people can buy a thing with great difficulty, it will probably have a lower price than if everyone can buy a share of it easily. It improves transparency and makes prices more efficient. Also, financial innovation tends to be done by banks and other financial intermediaries, and their goal is pretty much to do more intermediation. More liquidity means more trading, which means more profits for banks.

Another, funnier sort of financial innovation is about subtracting liquidity. If you can buy and sell something whenever you want at a clearly observable market price, that is efficient, sure, but it can also be annoying.

….

Or we have talked about a fun post from Cliff Asness titled “ The Illiquidity Discount,” in which he argues that private equity is essentially in the business of selling illiquidity. If you are a big institution and you buy stocks in public companies, the stocks might go down, and you will be sad for various reasons. You might be tempted to sell at the wrong time. You will have to report your results to your stakeholders, and if the stocks went down those results will be bad and you will get yelled at or fired. Whereas if you put your money in a private equity fund, it will buy whole public companies and take them private, and then you won’t know what the stock price is and won’t be able to sell. The private equity fund will send you periodic reports about the values of your investments, but those values won’t necessarily move that much with public-market stock prices: The fund will base its valuations on its estimates of long-term cash flows, and those will not change from day to day. By being illiquid, the private equity fund can look less volatile. Getting similar returns with less volatility is good; getting similar returns and feeling like you have less volatility also might be good.[4] Asness writes:

If people get that PE is truly volatile but you just don’t see it, what’s all the excitement about? Well, big time multi-year illiquidity and its oft-accompanying pricing opacity may actually be a feature not a bug! Liquid, accurately priced investments let you know precisely how volatile they are and they smack you in the face with it. What if many investors actually realize that this accurate and timely information will make them worse investors as they’ll use that liquidity to panic and redeem at the worst times? What if illiquid, very infrequently and inaccurately priced investments made them better investors as essentially it allows them to ignore such investments given low measured volatility and very modest paper drawdowns? “Ignore” in this case equals “stick with through harrowing times when you might sell if you had to face up to the full losses.” What if investors are simply smart enough to know that they can take on a lot more risk (true long-term risk) if it’s simply not shoved in their face every day (or multi-year period!)? 

One objection to this sort of financial product — illiquidity provision — is that it does not generate a lot of transactions. If you work at a bank and you think of a product that will cause customers to trade bonds or houses or diamonds more often, then it is pretty easy to figure out how to make money from that product. 

Author(s): Matt Levine

Publication Date: 1 Nov 2022

Publication Site: Bloomberg

UK Pensions Got Margin Calls

Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-09-29/uk-pensions-got-margin-calls

Excerpt:

I said above that pension funds are unusually insensitive to short-term market moves: Nobody in the pension can ask for their money back for 30 years, so if the pension fund has a bad year it won’t face withdrawals and have to dump assets. Still, pension managers are sensitive to accounting. If your job is to manage a pension, you want to go to your bosses at the end of the year and say “this pension is now 5% less underfunded than it was last year.” And if you have to instead say “this pension is now 5% more underfunded than it was last year,” you are sad and maybe fired; if the pension gets too underfunded your regulator will step in. You want to avoid that.

And so the way you will approach your job is something like:

  1. You will try to beat your benchmark, buying stocks and higher-yielding bonds to try to grow the value of your assets.
  2. You will hedge the risk of rates going down. If rates go down, your liabilities will rise (faster than your assets); you are short gilts. You want to do something to minimize this risk.

The way to do that hedging is basically to get really long gilts in a leveraged way. If you have £29 of assets, you might invest them like this:

  1. £24 in gilts,
  2. £5 in stocks, and
  3. borrow another £24 and put that in gilts too.[5] [5] No science to this number, and you’d probably do a bit less if your stocks are correlated with rates.

That way, if rates go down, the value of your portfolio goes up to match the increasing value of your liabilities. So you are hedged. You were short gilts, as an accounting matter, and you’ve solved that by borrowing money to buy more gilts. In practice, the way you have borrowed this money is probably not by actually getting a loan and buying gilts but by doing some sort of derivative (interest-rate swap, etc.) with a bank, where the bank pays you if rates go down and you pay the bank if rates go up. And you have posted some collateral with the bank, and as interest rates move up or down you post more or less collateral. 

This all makes total sense, in its way. But notice that you now have borrowed short-term money to buy volatile financial assets. The thing that was so good about pension funds — their structural long-termism, the fact that you can’t have a run on a pension fund: You’ve ruined that! Now, if interest rates go up (gilts go down), your bank will call you up and say “you used our money to buy assets, and the assets went down, so you need to give us some money back.” And then you have to sell a bunch of your assets — the gilts and stocks that you own — to pay off those margin calls. Through the magic of derivatives you have transformed your safe boring long-term pension fund into a risky leveraged vehicle that could get blown up by market moves.

I know this is bad but I find something aesthetically beautiful about it. If you have a pot of money that is immune to bank runs, over time, modern finance will find a way to make it vulnerable to bank runs. That is an emergent property of modern finance. No one sits down and says “let’s make pension funds vulnerable to bank runs!” Finance, as an abstract entity, just sort of does that on its own.

Anyway, as I said above, 30-year UK gilt rates were about 2.5% this summer. They got to nearly 5% this week, and were at about 3.9% at 9 a.m. New York time today. You can fill in the rest.

Author(s): Matt Levine

Publication Date: 29 Sept 2022

Publication Site: Bloomberg