Pension Funds Are Pulling Hundreds of Billions From Stocks

Link: https://www.wsj.com/finance/investing/pension-funds-stocks-bonds-679b8536?st=v0qwhq895irsqxn&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

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Stock portfolios at large pension funds had a blockbuster run. Now, managers are cashing out.

Corporate pension funds are shifting money into bonds. State and local government funds are swapping stocks for alternative investments. The nation’s largest public pension, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, is planning to move close to $25 billion out of equities and into private equity and private debt.

Like investors of all kinds, the funds are slowly adapting to a world of yield, where they can get sizable returns on risk-free assets. That is rippling throughout markets, as investors assess how much risk they want to take on. Moving out of stocks could mean surrendering some potential gains. Hold too much, for too long, and prices might fall.

Author(s): Heather Gillers, Charley Grant

Publication Date: 18 Apr 2024

Publication Site: WSJ

Tweets of the Day on Bonds, Jobs, Leverage, China, Oil, and Artificial Intelligence

Link:https://mishtalk.com/economics/tweets-of-the-day-on-bonds-jobs-leverage-china-oil-and-artificial-intelligence/

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Everyone knows, or at least should know, that the “Big 3” rating agencies that rate about 98 percent of all debt all issue trash ratings. Here’s the background on how that happened.

Rating agencies used to get paid by investors on the basis of how well they did at estimating the likelihood of default. The better your ratings, the more sought out your opinions.

In the mid 1970s, the SEC created nationally recognized statistical ratings organizations (NRSROs). Following that idiotic regulation, the rating agencies got paid on the basis of how much debt they rated, not how accurate their ratings were. Fees come from corporations issuing debt, not investors seeking true default risk.

The more stuff you rate AAA, the more business you get from companies who want their debt rated. The new model is ass backward, and why ratings are trash. A genuine fiasco happened with ratings during the Great Financial Crisis with tons of garbage rated AAA went to zero.

There should not be NRSROs. The SEC made matters much worse, except of course for the Big 3 who have a a captured, mandated audience, coupled with massive conflicts of interest.

Author(s): Mike Shedlock

Publication Date: 5 Aug 2023

Publication Site: Mish Talk

Bond prices mean revert after all

Link: https://allisonschrager.substack.com/p/bond-prices-mean-revert-after-all?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

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On day one of Fixed Income School, you learn that bond prices mean-revert. While a stock or a house’s price can continue to increase as the company or land becomes more valuable, yields can only go so low. Nobody will pay to lend someone else money, or at least, they won’t pay much to do that. Bond prices can only climb so high before they fall. While some evidence shows that yields trended downward slightly as the world became less risky, they still tended to revert to a mean greater than zero.

It’s easy to blame Silicon Valley Bank for being blissfully ignorant of such details. They purchased long-term bonds and mortgage-backed securities when the Fed was doing QE on steroids! Did they expect that to last forever? Well, maybe that was a reasonable assumption, based on the last 15 years, but I digress.

Many of these smaller banks, particularly Silicon Valley, are in trouble because they were particularly exposed to rate risk since their depositors’ profit model relied on low rates. So, when rates increased, they needed their money—precisely when their asset values would also plummet. It’s terrible risk management. But, to be fair, even the Fed (the FED!) did not anticipate a significant rate rise. Stress tests didn’t even consider such a scenario, even as rates were already climbing. Why would we expect bankers in California to be smarter than all-knowing bank regulators?

According to the New York Times, Central Bankers still expect rates to fall back to 2.5%. Why? Because of inequality and an aging population. But how does that work, and what’s the mechanism behind it? No good answer, or not one that squares with data before 1985, but we can hope. Sometimes we just want something to be true and for it to be true for politically convenient reasons.

Author(s): Allison Schrager

Publication Date: 20 Mar 2023

Publication Site: Known Unknowns at Substack

US bond funds rake in more cash despite inflation fears

Link: https://www.ft.com/content/787d1be6-e7d9-43a2-b77c-07916fe19f3e

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Analysts attributed the popularity of bond funds — which do not include money-market holdings — to concerns about lofty stock valuations and an ageing population’s need for steady income during retirement.

“Financial advisers follow asset allocation models and portfolio rebalancing and demographics are strong trends,” said Shelly Antoniewicz, ICI senior director of financial and industry research. “The cumulative flow to bond funds lines up nicely with the percentage of the population over 65 years.”

Author(s): Michael Mackenzie

Publication Date: 6 July 2021

Publication Site: Financial Times

Not Even Bond Traders Can Predict the Future

Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-18/bond-traders-can-t-predict-inflation-any-better-than-anyone-else

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Historically, bond yields have not been very good at predicting inflation.

In the last 70 years, bond yields rarely rose ahead of inflation, going up only after inflation takes hold.  One study indicated that past inflation trends were a better predictor of bond rates than what future inflation turned out to be.

Does this mean bond traders are wrong? Not necessarily. It may just reflect that inflation is unpredictable and bond traders don’t know any more about the future than the rest of us. All they have is the past data and current prices to make their predictions, too. So when inflation suddenly spikes — as it has in the past — bond traders are as surprised as everyone else.

Author(s): Allison Schrager

Publication Date: 18 June 2021

Publication Site: Bloomberg

Bond Selloff Prompts Stock Investors to Confront Rising Rates

Link: https://www.wsj.com/articles/bond-selloff-prompts-rethink-bystock-investors-11613919600

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The sharp increase this month in U.S. government-bond yields is pressuring the stock market and forcing investors to more seriously confront the implications of rising interest rates.

The lift in yields largely reflects investor expectations of a strong economic recovery. However, the collateral damage could include higher borrowing costs for businesses, more options for investors who had seen few alternatives to stocks and less favorable valuation models for some hot technology shares, investors and analysts said.

As of Friday [Feb 19], the yield on the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury note stood at 1.344%, up from 1.157% just five trading sessions earlier and roughly 0.9% at the start of the year.

Author(s): Sam Goldfarb

Publication Date: 21 February 2021

Publication Site: Wall Street Journal

Monetary policy and the corporate bond market: How important is the Fed information effect?

Link: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/monetary-policy-and-the-corporate-bond-market-how-important-is-the-fed-information-effect.htm

Abstract:

Does expansionary monetary policy drive up prices of risky assets? Or, do investors interpret monetary policy easing as a signal that economic fundamentals are weaker than they previously believed, prompting riskier asset prices to fall? We test these competing hypotheses within the U.S. corporate bond market and find evidence strongly in favor of the second explanation—known as the “Fed information effect”. Following an unanticipated monetary policy tightening (easing), returns on corporate bonds with higher credit risk outperform (underperform). We conclude that monetary policy surprises are predominantly interpreted by market participants as signaling information about the state of the economy.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2021.010

PDF: Full Paper

Author(s): Michael Smolyansky and Gustavo Suarez

Publication Date: 16 February 2021

Publication Site: Federal Reserve Board