Milliman analysis: Corporate pension funding ratio surges to 112.8% in October thanks to rising discount rates

Link: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/milliman-analysis-corporate-pension-funding-ratio-surges-to-112-8-in-october-thanks-to-rising-discount-rates-301669154.html

Excerpt:

Milliman, Inc., a premier global consulting and actuarial firm, today released the results of its latest Milliman 100 Pension Funding Index (PFI), which analyzes the 100 largest U.S. corporate pension plans.

During October, the Milliman 100 PFI funded ratio rose from 108.8% on September 30 to 112.8% on October 31, reaching a new high for the year. The change was driven by a 35-basis-point hike in the monthly discount rate. The PFI projected benefit obligation decreased to $1.266 trillion as the discount rate rose from 5.36% in September to 5.71% for October—the highest rate since March 2010. This increase helped to offset October’s flat investment returns of 0.21%, which lowered the Milliman 100 PFI asset value by $4 billion.

Publication Date: 4 Nov 2022

Publication Site: PRNEWSWIRE

German pensions could rise by up to 4.2% in 2023 – proposal

Link: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/german-pensions-could-rise-by-up-42-2023-proposal-2022-11-05/

Excerpt:

BERLIN, Nov 5 (Reuters) – Germany’s more than 20 million pensioners will likely see their state benefit rise by up to 4.2% from July 2023, according to a governemt proposal seen by Reuters, lower than the expected inflation rate of 7.0%.

The state pension in western Germany will rise by 3.5%, while in former East Germany it will increase by 4.2% according to the draft, as the government continues to narrow the gap between the two regions.

Author(s): Holger Hansen, Christoph Steitz

Publication Date: 5 Nov 2022

Publication Site: Reuters

Interest Rate Hikes Will Make Climate Change Worse

Link: https://jacobin.com/2022/10/interest-rates-climate-change-liz-truss-tories

Excerpt:

Raising interest rates won’t just push Britain into a recession and make the cost-of-living crisis worse for working-class people — it will discourage badly needed investments in green energy, undermining the UK’s efforts to address climate change.

….

The theory goes that higher interest rates help bring inflation down by making credit more expensive across the economy and reducing the amount of money firms and families have to spend on goods and services, thereby slowing price increases. But our inflation is predominantly driven by external factors, most notably high gas prices resulting from COVID-19 supply issues and the war in Ukraine. Instead, the bank’s policy is likely to push the UK economy into a recession, without addressing the main underlying causes of rising prices. That also means higher costs of borrowing for the very investments we need to reduce our reliance on costly fossil gas, like wind farms and home insulation.

To compound the problem, higher interest rates discourage investment in clean projects more than dirty ones. Running renewables doesn’t cost much: they rely on free wind and solar energy instead of expensive fossil fuels. But building them in the first place does come with high initial costs, meaning they are particularly impacted by the higher costs of credit. Similarly, insulation and heat pumps need to be paid for up front, before they begin to lower energy bills for households. Demand for improvements like heat pumps is significantly influenced by the availability of cheap loans to cover the initial installation costs.

Author(s): LUKASZ KREBEL

Publication Date: 23 Oct 2022

Publication Site: Jacobin

Transcript: Tom Rampulla

Link: https://ritholtz.com/2022/10/transcript-tom-rampulla/

Excerpt:

BARRY RITHOLTZ, HOST, MASTERS IN BUSINESS: This week on the podcast, I have an extra special guest, Tom Rampulla has been with the Vanguard Group since 1988. He has worked with every CEO, starting with Jack Bogle, all the way up to the current CEO Tim Buckley, and has essentially helped to establish the Financial Advisors Group, essentially the group at Vanguard that works with RIAs and broker dealers and other financial professionals who provide portfolios, advice, financial plans to the investing public.

He has a unique perch from with which to view the financial services industry, both from within Vanguard as well as looking out over the financial landscape and seeing what’s going on with such trends as mutual funds, ETFs, direct indexing, the rise of passive, the rise not just of Vanguard, but the dominance of Vanguard, and the associated Vanguard effect, the pressure on fees that have helped make investing so affordable. We discussed all these things as well as why there has never been a better time to be a retail investor than right now, right here in this era. I found the conversation to be absolutely fascinating, and I think you will also.

So with no further ado, my conversation with the Vanguard Group’s Tom Rampulla.

I’m Barry Ritholtz. You’re listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest this week is Tom Rampulla. He is the managing director of Vanguard’s Financial Advisor Services Division, where he began back in 2002. That group provides investment services, education and research to more than a thousand financial advisory firms, representing more than $3 trillion in assets. Tom joined Vanguard back in 1988. Tom Rampulla, welcome to Bloomberg.

THOMAS RAMPULLA, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL ADVISOR SERVICES DIVISION, VANGUARD: Thanks, Barry. It’s great to be here.

……

RAMPULLA: You talk to them off the ledge. My clients, the advisors are really earning their fees right now, and providing a tremendous amount of value. So there’s a lot of phone volume, a lot of digital volume, so we’re very, very, very busy. And you know, it’s all about calming people down, we’ll get through this, you look at the long term. Things tend to work out. We — you know, our investing philosophy is, first of all, get an objective, put a plan together, make sure it’s a low cost plan.

And the other thing is be disciplined, right. Stick to your plan, just get rid of the noise. This is big noise. This isn’t just some little blip. This is big noise, but you know, get rid of noise and be disciplined. Most times that’s around rebalancing. This time, stocks and bonds are both going down, so you’re not rebalancing so much. But you know, March of 2020 was a great opportunity to rebalance and add some value. So it’s really sticking to that long-term approach and that discipline is what we really recommend.

Publication Date: 18 Oct 2022

Publication Site: Barry Ritholtz

Beware of Private Equity Gobbling Up Life Insurance and Annuity Companies

Link: https://cepr.net/report/beware-of-private-equity-gobbling-up-life-insurance-and-annuity-companies/

Graphic:

Excerpt:

Private equity (PE) firms have had their eye on individual retirement savings since 2013 when they were first allowed to market directly to individuals. Pension funds already allocate workers’ retirement savings to PE firms, which use these assets to fund a range of risky equity and debt investments. Access to personal retirement savings, including IRAs and 401(k)s, would open up a huge new source of capital for PE.

PE firms’ first attempts to get a piece of these very sizable direct contribution assets were largely unsuccessful. More recently, however, they have turned to acquiring and/or managing life insurance and annuity assets. Some PE firms buy out life insurance and annuity companies, acquiring their assets. Others take a minority stake in a life insurance or annuity company in exchange for the right to manage all of the company’s assets. In both cases, the PE firm substantially increases assets under its management. They have also stepped-up efforts to recruit near-wealthy as well as wealthy investors, so-called retail investors, to allow PE firms to manage their assets. These activities have been a game changer for the largest PE firms. As Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwarzman put it as he lauded the firm’s third quarter 2021 performance, this quarter has been “the most consequential quarter [in history] . . . a defining moment in terms of our expansion into the vast retail and insurance markets.”1

Meanwhile, policyholders find that a PE firm now manages their retirement savings. This raises a major concern for individuals and government regulators: Given PE firms’ track record of failing to observe their duty of care as owners of Main Street companies as well as their poor fund performance in recent years,2 can they be trusted to protect the retirement savings of millions of Americans?

Author(s): EILEEN APPELBAUM

Publication Date: 13 January 2022

Publication Site: CEPR (Center for Economic and Policy Research)

Why do pension schemes use liability-driven investment?

Link: https://lotsmoore.co.uk/why-do-pension-schemes-use-liability-driven-investment/

Excerpt:

Liability-driven investment allows schemes to invest in the growth assets they need to close the funding gap while reducing the impact of interest rates on the liabilities. This is achieved by assigning a portion of a portfolio to an LDI fund. Rather than this fund just holding gilts, it holds a mixture of gilts and gilt repos.

A gilt repo is re-purchase agreement. The LDI manager sells a gilt to a counterparty bank while arranging to buy back that gilt at a later date for an agreed price. This gilt repurchase agreement provides cash to the pension scheme which it can then use to invest in other assets.

This mixture of gilts and gilt repos in an LDI fund uses leverage to provide capital to the pension fund. It is akin to using a mortgage to buy a house. Different levels of leverage were available in the funds – the more leverage, the greater the ratio of gilt repos to gilts in a fund.

The more leverage in a fund, the less capital a pension scheme had to lock up in government debt and the more it could use to invest in assets which could help to close its funding gap. This was helpful when interest rates were low but became problematic when gilt yields rose.

Author(s): Charlotte Moore

Publication Date: 17 Oct 2022

Publication Site: Lots Moore

Bank of England to Treasury, House of Commons

Link: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/30136/documents/174584/default/

Graphic:

Excerpt:

LDI strategies enable DB pension funds to use leverage (i.e. to borrow) to increase their
exposure to long-term gilts, while also holding riskier and higher-yielding assets such as
equities in order to boost their returns. The LDI funds maintain a cushion between the
value of their assets and liabilities, intended to absorb any losses on the gilts. If losses
exceed this cushion, the DB pension fund investor is asked to provide additional funds
to increase it, a process known as rebalancing. This can be a more difficult process for
pooled LDI funds, in part because they manage investment from a large number of small
and medium sized DB pension funds.

Diagram 1 gives a stylised example of how the gilt market dynamics last week could
have affected a DB pension fund that was investing in an LDI fund. In this illustrative and simplified example, the left hand side of the diagram shows that the scheme is underfunded (in deficit) before any change in gilt yields, with the value of its assets lower than
the value of its liabilities. More than 20% of UK DB pension funds were in deficit in August
2022 and more than 40% were a year earlier. In this example, the fund is holding growth
assets to boost returns and has also invested in an LDI fund to increase holdings of longterm gilts, funded by repo borrowing at 2 times leverage (i.e. half of the holding of gilts in
the LDI fund is funded by borrowing). The cushion (labelled ‘capital’) is half the size of
the gilt holdings.

The right hand side of the diagram shows what would happen should gilt yields rise (and
gilt prices fall). The value of the gilts that are held in the LDI fund falls, in this example by
around 30%. This severely erodes the cushion in the LDI fund. If gilt prices fell further, it
would risk eroding the entire cushion, leaving the LDI fund with zero net asset value and
leading to default on the repo borrowing. This would mean the bank counterparty would
take ownership of the gilts. It should be noted that in this example, the DB pension fund
might be better off overall as a result of the increase in gilt yields. This is because the
market value of its equity and shorter-term bond holdings (‘other assets’) would not fall
by as much as the present value of its pension liabilities, as the latter are more sensitive
to long-term market interest rates. The erosion of the cushion of the LDI fund would lead the LDI fund either to sell gilts to reduce its leverage or to ask the DB pension fund
investors to provide additional funds.


In practice, the move in gilt yields last week threatened to exceed the size of the cushion
for many LDI funds, requiring them to either sell gilts into a falling market or to ask DB
pension plan trustees to raise funds to provide more capital.

Author(s): Sir John Cunliffe, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability

Publication Date: 5 Oct 2022

Publication Site: UK Parliament

Stable Fund Focus in Another Excessive Fee Suit

Link: https://www.napa-net.org/news-info/daily-news/stable-fund-focus-another-excessive-fee-suit#.Y0F5DNPIdlA.linkedin

Excerpt:

The latest excessive fee suit targets “wildly excessive compensation,” an allegedly imprudent stable value offering, and the unmonitored use of “float” income. 

More specifically, the participant-plaintiffs of Miami, Florida-based Lennar Corp. are raising issues with the recordkeeping/administrative fees (“wildly excessive compensation”) paid by the plan, the prudence of retaining Prudential’s stable value fund, and the use of float income by Prudential (the plan’s recordkeeper). 

The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Catenac v. Lennar Corp., S.D. Fla., No. 1:22-cv-23232, complaint 10/5/22), is directed at a plan with approximately $1.2 billion in assets and nearly 13,000 participants. The participant-plaintiffs are represented here by Morgan & Morgan PA.   

Author(s): Nevin E. Adams, JD

Publication Date: 6 Oct 2022

Publication Site: NAPA-net

Editorial: No Crypto in 401(k)s

Link: https://www.toledoblade.com/opinion/editorials/2022/10/08/no-crypto-in-401-k-s/stories/20221004017

Excerpt:

Meanwhile, in Congress the Retirement Savings Modernization Act was just introduced to allow cryptocurrency and just about anything short of lottery tickets into America’s 401(k) accounts. The alternative asset industry — private equity, hedge funds, venture capital, real estate, and more — has been trying for years to offer their speculative products — and reap huge fees in the process — through personal retirement accounts as they are already able to do in some public pensions, such as Ohio’s.

There has been no legal barrier to these investments, and the Trump administration’s Department of Labor went so far as to specify that alternative investments could be part of 401(k)s, a decision affirmed by the Biden Administration. But companies administering 401(k) accounts are fiduciaries, and they’ve avoided alternative investments in fear of getting sued for breach of fiduciary duty for offering them to workers. For decades, prudence has prevailed and 401(k) retirement accounts have not allowed high-fee, illiquid funds as a 401(k) option.

The proposed bill simply states that alternative investments, despite the higher fees associated with them, are “covered” investments that do not establish fiduciary breach by their presence in a 401(k) plan. The cloak of congressionally created cover for alternative investments is needed because the current commonsense assumption is that the mere presence of these investments is strong evidence fiduciary duty has been breached.

Author(s): Blade Editorial Board

Publication Date: 8 Oct 2022

Publication Site: Toledo Blade

Bank of England says pension funds were hours from disaster before it intervened

Link: https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/06/bank-of-england-says-pension-funds-were-hours-from-disaster-before-it-intervened.html

Excerpt:

The Bank of England told lawmakers that a number of pension funds were hours from collapse when it decided to intervene in the U.K. long-dated bond market last week.

The central bank’s Financial Policy Committee stepped in after a massive sell-off of U.K. government bonds — known as “gilts” — following the new government’s fiscal policy announcements on Sept. 23.

The emergency measures included a two-week purchase program for long-dated bonds and the delay of the bank’s planned gilt sales, part of its unwinding of Covid pandemic-era stimulus.

The plunge in bond values caused panic in particular for Britain’s £1.5 trillion ($1.69 trillion) in so-called liability-driven investment funds (LDIs). Long-dated gilts account for around two-thirds of LDI holdings.

…..

The 30-year gilt yield fell more than 100 basis points after the bank announced its emergency package on Wednesday Sept. 28, offering markets a much-needed reprieve.

Cunliffe noted that the scale of the moves in gilt yields during this period was “unprecedented,” with two daily increases of more than 35 basis points in 30-year yields.

“Measured over a four day period, the increase in 30 year gilt yields was more than twice as large as the largest move since 2000, which occurred during the ‘dash for cash’ in 2020,” he said.

Author(s): Elliot Smith

Publication Date: 6 Oct 2022

Publication Site: CNBC

U.K.’s LDI-related turmoil puts spotlight on use of derivatives

Link: https://www.pionline.com/pension-funds/uks-ldi-related-turmoil-could-spread-experts-say

Graphic:

Excerpt:

The Bank of England’s emergency bond-buying last week helped shore up U.K. pension funds and threw a spotlight on a popular strategy among corporate plans known as LDI – or liability-driven investing.

Total assets in LDI strategies in the U.K. rose to almost £1.6 trillion ($1.8 trillion) at the end of 2021, quadrupling from £400 billion in 2011, according to the Investment Association, a trade group that represents U.K. managers. Many LDI mandates allow for the use of derivatives to hedge inflation and interest rate risk.

….

Here’s how LDI works: Liability-driven investing is employed by many pension funds to mitigate the risk of unfunded liabilities by matching their asset allocation and investment policy with current and expected future liabilities. The LDI portion of a pension fund’s portfolio utilizes liability-hedging strategies to reduce interest-rate risk, which could include long government and credit bonds and derivatives exposure.

Jeff Passmore, LDI solutions strategist at MetLife Investment Management, said the situation with U.K. pension plans “has been challenging, and the heavy use of derivatives in the U.K. LDI model has made the current situation worse than it would otherwise be.”

While most U.S. LDI portfolios rely on bonds rather than derivatives, ‘”those U.S. plan sponsors who have leaned heavily on derivatives and leverage should take a cautionary lesson from what we’re seeing currently across the Atlantic.”

….

The U.K. pension debacle “is a plain-and-simple problem of leverage,” Charles Van Vleet, assistant treasurer and chief investment officer at Textron, said in an email.

Many U.K. pension plans were interest rate-hedged at 70%, while also holding 60% in growth assets, suggesting 30% leverage, he said. The portfolio’s growth assets have lost around 20% of value if held in public equities and fixed income or about 5% down if held in private equity, he noted.

“Therefore, to make margin calls on their derivative rate exposure they had to sell growth assets – in some cases, selling physical-gilts to meet derivative-gilt margin calls,” Mr. Van Vleet said.

“The problem is worse for plans who gain rate exposure with leveraged ETFs. The leverage in those funds is commonly via cleared interest rate swaps. Margin calls for cleared swaps can only be met with cash – not posted collateral. Therefore, again selling physical-gilts to meet derivative-gilt margin calls.”

Author(s):

BRIAN CROCE
COURTNEY DEGEN
PALASH GHOSH
ROB KOZLOWSKI

Publication Date: 5 Oct 2022

Publication Site: Pensions & Investments

UK Pensions Got Margin Calls

Link: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-09-29/uk-pensions-got-margin-calls

Excerpt:

I said above that pension funds are unusually insensitive to short-term market moves: Nobody in the pension can ask for their money back for 30 years, so if the pension fund has a bad year it won’t face withdrawals and have to dump assets. Still, pension managers are sensitive to accounting. If your job is to manage a pension, you want to go to your bosses at the end of the year and say “this pension is now 5% less underfunded than it was last year.” And if you have to instead say “this pension is now 5% more underfunded than it was last year,” you are sad and maybe fired; if the pension gets too underfunded your regulator will step in. You want to avoid that.

And so the way you will approach your job is something like:

  1. You will try to beat your benchmark, buying stocks and higher-yielding bonds to try to grow the value of your assets.
  2. You will hedge the risk of rates going down. If rates go down, your liabilities will rise (faster than your assets); you are short gilts. You want to do something to minimize this risk.

The way to do that hedging is basically to get really long gilts in a leveraged way. If you have £29 of assets, you might invest them like this:

  1. £24 in gilts,
  2. £5 in stocks, and
  3. borrow another £24 and put that in gilts too.[5] [5] No science to this number, and you’d probably do a bit less if your stocks are correlated with rates.

That way, if rates go down, the value of your portfolio goes up to match the increasing value of your liabilities. So you are hedged. You were short gilts, as an accounting matter, and you’ve solved that by borrowing money to buy more gilts. In practice, the way you have borrowed this money is probably not by actually getting a loan and buying gilts but by doing some sort of derivative (interest-rate swap, etc.) with a bank, where the bank pays you if rates go down and you pay the bank if rates go up. And you have posted some collateral with the bank, and as interest rates move up or down you post more or less collateral. 

This all makes total sense, in its way. But notice that you now have borrowed short-term money to buy volatile financial assets. The thing that was so good about pension funds — their structural long-termism, the fact that you can’t have a run on a pension fund: You’ve ruined that! Now, if interest rates go up (gilts go down), your bank will call you up and say “you used our money to buy assets, and the assets went down, so you need to give us some money back.” And then you have to sell a bunch of your assets — the gilts and stocks that you own — to pay off those margin calls. Through the magic of derivatives you have transformed your safe boring long-term pension fund into a risky leveraged vehicle that could get blown up by market moves.

I know this is bad but I find something aesthetically beautiful about it. If you have a pot of money that is immune to bank runs, over time, modern finance will find a way to make it vulnerable to bank runs. That is an emergent property of modern finance. No one sits down and says “let’s make pension funds vulnerable to bank runs!” Finance, as an abstract entity, just sort of does that on its own.

Anyway, as I said above, 30-year UK gilt rates were about 2.5% this summer. They got to nearly 5% this week, and were at about 3.9% at 9 a.m. New York time today. You can fill in the rest.

Author(s): Matt Levine

Publication Date: 29 Sept 2022

Publication Site: Bloomberg