Category: Insurance

U.S. Asset Managers Fear Federal Reserve Rate Hikes Will Cause Recession

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.ai-cio.com/news/u-s-asset-managers-fear-federal-reserve-rate-hikes-will-cause-recession/?oly_enc_id=2359H8978023B3G

Excerpt:

A significant portion of U.S.-based asset managers think further Federal Reserve rate hikes would lead to a recession or some disruption in global financial markets, according to research last month by London-based CoreData Research.

The greatest anticipated risk of continued Federal Reserve rate hikes is a possible recession. Overall, 59% of survey respondents took a neutral look at a recession scenario, that there would be “a moderate recession in 2023, followed by a gradual recovery as central bank policies bring down inflation over time,” while 14% opted for a bull case, defined as “a mild recession in the first half of 2023, followed by a strong recovery, falling inflation and rising equity markets [in the second half of 2023],” and 27% said they agree with a bear case, defined as a scenario in which “stagflation and a deep recession [occur] in 2023, accompanied by a 10-20% fall in the equity markets, as central banks struggle to defeat inflation which remains high.”

….

Within fixed income, 36% of respondents said they are increasing allocations to investment-grade corporate bonds, the most of any fixed-income subtype, and 33% are set to increase allocations to government bonds. A further 23% of respondents said they plan to cut their exposures to emerging-market debt as a consequence of higher yields domestically.

Author(s): Dusty Hagedorn

Publication Date: 24 Feb 2023

Publication Site: ai-CIO

CalPERS’ Refusal to Put Clearly Insolvent Long-Term Care Insurance Plan in Bankruptcy Increases Harm to Policyholders and Makes Board and Responsible Executives Liable

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2023/02/calpers-refusal-to-put-clearly-insolvent-long-term-care-insurance-plan-in-bankruptcy-increases-harm-to-policyholders-and-makes-board-and-responsible-executives-liable.html

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Excerpt:

The CalPERS long-term care fiasco continues, with the board and staff taking a course of action that increases harm to policyholders by continuing to bleed them rather than put the program in bankruptcy.

For those new to this train wreck, the public comment at the February 14 CalPERS board meeting by policy-holder and certified financial planner Lawrence Grossman provides an introduction. A key bit of background is that state legislation allowed CalPERS to jump on the long-term care insurance bandwagon in the 1990s. Most of these insurance plans have gotten into a world of hurt by underestimating the degree to which proper elder care would extend lifepsans of policy-holders and overestimating the lapse rate (lapsed policies mean the premiums paid by dropouts benefit the remaining policyholders). But CalPERS’ recklessness and incompetence were in a league of its own.

CalPERS not only considerably underpriced its policies compared to commercial competitors, but it made matters worse via giving CalPERS policyholders the options of lifetime benefits (as opposed to fixed dollar benefits) and inflation protection. Inflation protection would seem like an incredible promise for any long-term insurance scheme. Yet the policies were advertised as CalPERS policies, not those of a free-standing “CalPERS Long-Term Care Fund,” as in not backed by CalPERS or the state of California.

….

Four years later and things are going according to CalPERS’ abusive plan. Even though Judge Highberger clearly rejected CalPERS’ position that it can violate policy terms and raise premiums, CalPERS has continued to increase premiums because the court so far has issued only preliminary decisions. Note these increases are vastly in excess of those implemented by commercial carriers.

Author(s): Yves Smith

Publication Date: 15 Feb 2023

Publication Site: naked capitalism

Collateralized Loan Obligation – Stress Testing U.S. Insurers’ Year-End 2021 Exposure

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/capital-markets-special-reports-clo-stressed-analysis-ye2021.pdf

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Excerpt:

The stress test analysis found that 1,114 U.S. insurers, with a surplus of about $1.2 trillion, held some
amount of CLO tranches modeled. Similar to last year’s stress testing results, we found that the losses on
insurers’ CLO investments that were modeled, even in the stressed scenarios, were highly concentrated.


To understand the impact of potential losses on insurers, principal loss (compare with Table 7) for
scenarios A, B, and C was divided by each insurer’s year-end 2021 total surplus. For each scenario, the
principal loss as a percentage of total surplus for each of the 1,114 insurers was sorted from highest to
lowest. Then the insurer with the largest percentage loss was referenced as “Insurer 1,” the insurer with
the second largest percentage loss was referenced as “Insurer 2,” and so on until the smallest percentage loss, which was referenced as “‘Insurer 1,114” (x-axis). Please note the difference in the scale of the y-axis
in Charts 1, 2, and 3.


Chart 1 shows the distribution of losses as a percentage of surplus for December 2021’s Scenario A.
Although the bulk of insurers show no losses, 49 of the 1,114 insurers experienced losses in this
scenario. Intuitively, the losses were derived primarily from CCC-rated CLO tranches. The largest loss as
a percentage of surplus under Scenario A was 9.72%. Similar to the analysis for year-end 2020, no
insurers experienced double digit losses.

Author(s): Jean-Baptiste Carelus, Eric Kolchinsky, Hankook Lee, Jennifer Johnson, Michele Wong, Azar Abramov

Publication Date: Jan 2023

Publication Site: NAIC Capital Markets Special Reports

A Fraud-Filled 2022: Scammers and Lawsuits Fill the News

Mary Pat Campbell

Link:c https://www.thewealthadvisor.com/article/fraud-filled-2022-scammers-and-lawsuits-fill-news?mkt_tok=NDQ2LVVIUy0wMTMAAAGJIsrFu-ubnD_VamPIV5gs8dCoXVSfoUS6DR0oZTPmBTOiB6nIRrBML9aoxKGy2CiDh81BoEvZ4_6Zt5a-_GheqnYSTKutsKMFiWq7IQ8F55-O

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Excerpt:

LIMRA discussed its FraudShare program in this June 2022 story, and the statistics were striking.

More than a third (34%) of companies reported increases in account takeover attempts in 2021 as compared to the previous year, according to LIMRA. Account takeovers occur when someone takes ownership of an online account without the owner’s knowledge, often with stolen credentials. In addition to account takeovers attempts, 34% of companies saw increases in company impersonation and 31% had increases in claims fraud.

A LIMRA report showed that fraud incidents increased in 2021 in all but two categories of fraud. (Please note that fraud “incidents” shown in the chart below are attempts and do not indicate that the account takeover attempts were successful.)

Author(s): John Hilton, InsuranceNewsNet

Publication Date: 30 Dec 2022

Publication Site: The Wealth Advisor

2022 Insurance Regulation Report Card

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.rstreet.org/2022/12/12/2022-insurance-regulation-report-card/

PDF link of report: https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/r-street-policy-study-no-272.pdf

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Excerpt:

KEY POINTS

  1. The RSI Insurance Regulation Report Card analyzes and evaluates the effectiveness of state government regulation of property and casualty insurance and assigns a letter grade to all 50 states. The grade for each state was calculated by adding the weighted results from seven categories.
  2. The highest grades were for Kentucky and Arizona, both of which received an A+. At the other end of the spectrum, California and Alaska both scored an F.
  3. 20 states had a higher grade than they did in R Street’s 2020 edition of the Report Card, 23 maintained the same grade and seven had lower grades. This result is positive and means that insurance regulatory regimes have become more effective and efficient in the past two years.

Executive Summary
We are pleased to present the 10th edition of R Street’s Insurance Regulation Report Card, which analyzes and evaluates the effectiveness of U.S. insurance regulation of property and casualty insurance. The first iteration of this report was published in June 2012, and this 2022 edition largely follows the format of prior reports. It begins with a brief introduction on the current landscape of U.S. insurance regulation; reviews recent, relevant federal and state-based regulatory changes; presents a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of each state’s regulation of insurance in seven key categories; and synthesizes those category evaluations by offering a “report card” grade for each state for analysis and comparison purposes.

This report draws on 2021 year-end statutory insurance financial statistics and the most recent datasets available for non-financial information. Sources include data and reports from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), S&P Global Market Intelligence, National Conference of State Legislatures, R Street analyses and others, all of which were accessed through Sept. 30, 2022.

In this report, we seek to shed light on the same three foundational issues we have focused on in past iterations of this report card:
• How free are consumers to choose the insurance products they want?
• How free are insurers to provide the insurance products consumers want?
• How effectively are states discharging their duties to monitor insurer solvency and foster competitive, private insurance markets?

Author(s): Jerry Theodorou

Publication Date: 12 Dec 2022

Publication Site: R Street

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Financial Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives on “An Enduring Legacy: The Role of Financial Institutions in the Horrors of Slavery and the Need for Atonement, Part Two”

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-117-ba09-wstate-darityw-20221207.pdf

Testimony for this hearing: https://financialservices.house.gov/events/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=409969

Excerpt:

The collective amount required to close the disparity for approximately 40 million black American
descendants of persons enslaved in the United States will come to at least $14 trillion. This is a sum that
cannot be met reasonably by private donors or other levels of government. If generous donors created a
fund to eliminate the racial wealth gap by contributing $1 billion monthly, it would take a millennium to
reach $14 trillion. The combined budgets of all state and local governments used to meet all of their
obligations amount to less than $5 trillion.

Financial institutions were key supporters and beneficiaries of American slavery. The full scope of
creditor-debtor relationships interlocked with the slave plantation system has yet to be documented
adequately. For the record details are needed about which organizations were the financiers for the
New England textile industry, which bank or banks had Brooks Brothers, producers of “plantation wear”
for both the enslaved and the enslavers, as a client, and who were the lenders to the southern planters
themselves. This will require thick archival research that has yet to be undertaken.


It is now well established that a number of existing insurance companies participated significantly in
providing slaveowners with contracts to protect them for financial loss in the event of death or damage
of their human property, particularly their highly skilled property These include New York Life, known as
the Nautilus Insurance Company in the antebellum period, Aetna, Baltimore Life, Southern Mutual
Insurance Company, the Loews Corporation, and AIG.


Lloyd’s of London and RSA Insurance Group the point before the overseas slave trade was declared
illegal, insurance companies routinely protected voyages to procure captive Africans. British insurers
figured prominently, especially Lloyd’s of London and the RSA Insurance Group , in the form of one of its
ancestor business, London Assurance.

….

During the course of approximately 100 white terrorist assaults on black communities from the Civil War
to the 1940s, black lives were taken and black owned property was seized or destroyed by the white
mobsters. Black property owners who lived through the massacres rarely received any form of
compensation, particularly from insurance companies with whom they held policies.


An estimated present value of $611 million dollars of black-owned property was lost during the 1921
Tulsa massacre. What can best be described as a “Negro clause” in the policies gave insurance
companies the basis for denying the massacre victims’ claims. The “…insurance companies fell back on
an exclusionary clause…that…said insurers wouldn’t be held liable for loss ‘caused directly or indirectly
by invasion, insurrection, riot, civil or commotion, or military or usurped power’” (Council 2021).

Author(s): William Darity Jr., the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African American Studies, Economics, and Business at Duke University

Publication Date: 7 Dec 2022

Publication Site: House of Representatives, Financial Services Committee

Lawmakers Discuss How Financial Institutions Should Address Ties to Slavery

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2022/12/12/lawmakers-discuss-how-financial-institutions-should-address-ties-to-slavery/

Excerpt:

Rep. Al Green, D-Texas, wants to develop legislation that could affect how insurers and other financial institutions address their historical involvement in slavery.

Green and other lawmakers talked about ideas for legislation related to slavery during a  recent hearing of the House Financial Services oversight subcommittee on the role of financial institutions in the horrors of slavery.

….

Berkshire Hathaway, for example, descends partly from The Valley Falls Company, a textile manufacturer owned by members of an abolitionist family, Rockman said.

But members of the abolitionist family “rarely paused to ask where their cotton came from,” Rockman said. “Virtually every cotton fiber they spun and wove would have been slave-grown and slave-picked.”

William Darity Jr., a public policy professor at Duke University, talked about the role of insurers in slavery. He noted that Aetna, AIG, Baltimore Life, Loews Corp., New York Life and Southern Mutual Insurance Company all descend from companies that protected slaveowners against the deaths of slaves.

Author(s): Allison Bell

Publication Date: 12 Dec 2022

Publication Site: Think Advisor

2022 Mortality Improvement Survey Report

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.soa.org/resources/research-reports/2022/mort-improve-survey/

Report PDF: https://www.soa.org/4ad811/globalassets/assets/files/resources/research-report/2022/mort-improve-survey.pdf

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Excerpt:

The Committee on Life Insurance Mortality and Underwriting Surveys of the Society of Actuaries sent
companies a survey in May of 2019 on mortality improvement practices as of year-end 2018. The survey
results were released in January 2022. The survey was completed by respondents prior to the onset of
COVID-19. The present report provides an opportunity to update the results for pandemic-based changes
and compare the before and after surveys.
The 2022 survey was opened in March 2022 and closed by the end of April. Thirty-five respondent
companies participated in this survey, with 29 from the U.S. and six from Canada. This group was further
divided between direct writers (26) and reinsurers (nine).
This survey focused on the use of mortality improvement and how it has changed for financial projection
and pricing modeling following the initial stages of COVID-19. Details regarding assumptions and opinions
on mortality improvement in general were asked of the respondents.
National Association of Insurance Commissioners discussions on mortality improvement factors due to
COVID-19 for reserving purposes have taken place, but this survey was conducted before any adjustments
reacting to them.
Seventy-four percent (26 of 35) of respondents indicated using durational mortality improvement
assumptions in their life and annuity pricing and/or financial projections. Moreover, of those that used
durational mortality improvement assumptions, attained age and gender were the top two characteristics
in which assumptions varied.
Respondents were asked to indicate the different limitations when applying durational mortality
improvement assumptions. The Survey found that the most common lowest and highest attained age to
which durational mortality improvement was applied were 0 and about 100, respectively. The lowest and
highest durational mortality improvement rate ranged from -1.50% (deterioration) to 2.80%
(improvement). The time period in which the mortality improvement rates were applied ranged from 10 to
120 years, but this varied between life (10/120) and annuities (30/120). The most common time period was
20 to 30 years for life; less consensus was seen for annuities. Analysis is provided in Appendix C for
instances when highlights are shared in the body of the report.

Author(s): Ronora Stryker, Max Rudolph

Publication Date: December 2022

Publication Site: SOA Research Institute

Defining Discrimination in Insurance

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.casact.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Research-Paper_Defining_Discrimination_In_Insurance.pdf

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Excerpt:

Unfair Discrimination without Disproportionate Impact. As previously defined, unfair discrimination occurs when rating variables that have no relationship to expected loss are used. A hypothetical example could be if an insurer decided to use rating factors that charged those with red cars higher rates, even if the data did not show this. In this case, there would be no disproportionate impact, assuming protected classes do not own a large majority of red cars.
Disparate Treatment. Disparate treatment and unfair discrimination are not directly related if we use the Fair Trade Act definition of unfair discrimination. However, in states where rating on protected class is defined to be unfair discrimination, disparate treatment would be a subset of unfair discrimination. In such cases, an insurer would explicitly use protected class to charge higher rates, with the intention of prejudicing against that class.
Intentional Proxy Discrimination. If proxy discrimination is defined to require intent, it would be a subset of disparate treatment, whereby an insurer would deliberately substitute a facially neutral variable for protected class for the purpose of discrimination. Redlining is an example of this type of discrimination, given the use of location characteristics as proxies for race and social class.
Disproportionate Impact. Disproportionate impact focuses on effect on protected class, even if there is a relationship to expected loss. An example of this is the one mentioned in the AAA study, whereby a rating plan that uses age could disproportionately impact a minority group if those in that minority group tend to have higher risk ages. This disproportionate impact is not necessarily the same as proxy discrimination, since it is likely that even after controlling for minority status, age would have a relationship to
expected costs.

Unintentional Proxy Discrimination. If proxy discrimination is defined to be unintentional, the focus is more on disproportionate outcomes and the variables used to substitute for protected class. Several variables are being investigated by regulators to potentially be proxy discrimination and include criminal history for auto insurance rating. In order to prove proxy discrimination, an analysis would have to be performed to understand the extent to which criminal history proxies for minority status, and whether its predictive power would decrease when controlling for protected class. It is important to note once
again that terms like “unintentional proxy discrimination” may be subsumed by “disparate impact,” but they are included in this paper to show how various stakeholders use the term differently.
Disparate Impact. Disparate impact is unintentional discrimination, where there is disproportionate impact, but also other legal requirements, such as the existence of alternatives. To date, no disparate impact lawsuits against insurance companies have been won. An example of potential disparate impact (although it was not litigated as a lawsuit) is from health care. Optum used an algorithm to identify and allocate additional care to patients with complex healthcare needs. The algorithm was designed to create a risk score for each patient during the enrollment period. Patients above the 97th percentile were automatically enrolled in the program and thus allocated additional care. Upon an independent peer review of the model, researchers found that the model was in fact allocating artificially lower scores to Black patients, even though the model did not use race. The reason behind this was the model’s use of prior healthcare costs as an input. Black patients typically spend less than white patients on health care, which artificially allocated better health to Black patients.18
Unfair Discrimination and Disproportionate Impact. In this case, an insurer would use a variable that both has no relationship to expected loss, but also has an outsized effect on protected classes. An example of this could be the same red car case above, but where protected classes also owned almost all the red cars. In this case, higher rates would create a disproportionate effect on protected classes, while also having no relationship to expected loss.

Author(s): Kudakwashe F. Chibanda, FCAS

Publication Date: 2022

Publication Site: Casualty Actuarial Society

GE to End $2.5B Long-Term Care Insurance Reinsurance Arrangement

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2022/10/26/ge-to-end-2-5b-long-term-care-insurance-reinsurance-arrangement

Excerpt:

General Electric has agreed to end a long-term care insurance reinsurance relationship backed by $2.5 billion in assets.

The Boston-based company said Tuesday that it hopes to get the assets back by the end of the year.

….

For GE, the end of the reinsurance arrangement means that the company will face less worry about whether it can collect on reinsurance claims.

“This reduces counterparty risk,” Happe said.

GE will also have $2.5 billion in extra cash to reinvest.

Author(s): Allison Bell

Publication Date: 26 Oct 2022

Publication Site: Think Advisor

Group Life COVID-19 Mortality Survey Report

Mary Pat Campbell

Link: https://www.soa.org/4a368a/globalassets/assets/files/resources/research-report/2022/group-life-covid-19-mortality-03-2022-report.pdf

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Excerpt:

Tables 2.1 through 2.41 display high-level incidence results for the second quarter of 2020 through the first quarter of 2022 compared to the 2017-2019 baseline period for each combination of (a) incurred/reported basis and (b) count/amount basis as of March 31, 2022. In these tables, the number of COVID-19 claims has not been adjusted for seasonality, but the ratios to baseline have been adjusted for seasonality.


Note that additional data reported in April and May 2022 indicated that the 1Q 2022 excess mortality would likely complete downward from the 19.9% shown below using March data. The fully complete 1Q 2022 excess mortality is expected to remain above 15%.

….

The 24-month period of April 2020 through March 2022 showed the following Group Life mortality results:
• Estimated reported Group Life claim incidence rates were up 20.0% on a seasonally-adjusted basis
compared to 2017–2019 reported claims.
• Estimated incurred Group Life incidence rates were 20.9% higher than baseline on a seasonally-adjusted
basis. As noted above, the incurred incidence rates in February and March 2022 are based on fairly
incomplete data, so they are subject to change and should not be fully relied upon at this point.

Author(s):

Thomas J. Britt, FSA, MAAA
Paul Correia, FSA, MAAA
Patrick Hurley, FSA, MAAA
Mike Krohn, FSA, CERA, MAAA
Tony LaSala, FSA, MAAA
Rick Leavitt, ASA, MAAA
Robert Lumia, FSA, MAAA
Cynthia S. MacDonald, FSA, MAAA, SOA
Patrick Nolan, FSA, MAAA, SOA
Steve Rulis, FSA, MAAA
Bram Spector, FSA, MAAA

Publication Date: August 2022

Publication Site: SOA